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INTRODUCTION

In January 2009, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) released a 71-page glossy report entitled “Moving
Forward: Driving Investment and Innovation While Protecting
Consumers”2 appraising Kevin Martin’s four years as chairman
of the FCC.3 The report makes the claim that, in 2007, the FCC
acted to implement a competitive market for set-top boxes
(STB), the in-home electronic devices that control customers’
cable TV connections.4 As a result, “consumers may [now] purchase a box of their choice instead of having to lease equipment
from their cable providers.”5 The FCC sought to establish that
its regulatory effort—which kicked off with mandates in the
1996 Telecommunications Act and has generated no fewer than
20 FCC notices and over 6,000 comments and replies6—has
paid dividends, opening up valuable new choices for consumers.
In fact, the marketplace touted by regulators has failed to
materialize: today virtually all households subscribing to cable
2. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, MOVING FORWARD: DRIVING INVESTMENT
AND INNOVATION WHILE PROTECTING CONSUMERS (2009), [hereinafter
MOVING FORWARD], available at http://www.fcc.gov/fcc-moving-forwardreport.pdf.
3. Martin was the second of two FCC Chairs appointed by President
George W. Bush. The first, Michael Powell, headed the Commission from 2001
to 2005. Martin’s tenure spanned 2005 to 2009. Former FCC Chairman Kevin
J.
Martin:
Biography,
FED.
COMM.
COMMISION,
http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/previous/martin/biography.html (last updated Jan. 28, 2009); Former FCC Chairman Michael K. Powell: Biography,
FED.
COMM.
COMMISSION,
http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/previous/powell/biography.html (last updated Mar. 18, 2005).
4. MOVING FORWARD, supra note 2, at 25.
5. Id.
6. Electronic Comment Filing System, FED COMM. COMMISSION,
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/proceeding/view?z=v0oml&name=97-80 (last visited
Sept. 30, 2010).
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TV rent STBs from their service provider.7 The logic of the reforms was that subscribers, faced with a standalone (“unbundled”) STB choice, would head to Best Buy or Wal-Mart to buy
better equipment from competing retail vendors.8 Moreover,
these competitive options would enable new content and applications to flow to the household, bypassing cable operator “gatekeepers.”9 This rule would trigger an “evolution of the market
for navigation devices so that they become generally and competitively available through commercial retail outlets.”10 Yet,
despite implementation of the FCC’s regulations, and selfcongratulatory public statements, that market has not
emerged.11
This failure is, in less glossy reports, the assessment of the
FCC itself. In the Commission’s words, the CableCARD technology developed to facilitate modular conformity of competing
devices has “failed to stimulate a competitive retail market for
set-top boxes.”12 The top two cable STB manufacturers in North
America, Motorola and Cisco, both supply their STBs through
cable providers and account for an estimated ninety-five percent of the units’ shipments over the first three quarters in
2009.13 In contrast, “there are 0.5 million CableCARDS deployed in retail devices today, which represent approximately 1%
of all set-top boxes deployed in cable homes.”14 There are only
two manufacturers, TiVo and Moxi, that “continue to sell CableCARD-enabled set-top boxes through retail outlets.”15
The experience of the FCC’s attempt to create a “policyinduced competition” is important on its own and for its more
7. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL
BROADBAND PLAN 18 (2010), [hereinafter CONNECTING AMERICA], available at
http://download.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf.
8. See id. at 50 (stating that congress added Section 629 to the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to stimulate competition in set-top boxes).
9. Id.
10. Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, First Report and Order, 13
FCC Rcd. 14775, at 14780, para. 13 (1998) [hereinafter Implementation].
11. CONNECTING AMERICA, supra note 7, at 18.
12. CONNECTING AMERICA, supra note 7, at 50. See also Nate Anderson,
FCC Admits CableCARD a Failure, Vows to Try Something Else, ARS
TECHNICA (Dec. 4, 2010, 11:38 AM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/news/2009/12/fcc-admits-cablecard-a-failure-vows-to-try-somethingelse.ars.
13. CONNECTING AMERICA, supra note 7, at 50.
14. Id. at 51 (citation omitted).
15. Id.
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general implications. In many services, particularly in telecommunications, regulators have sought to restrict vertical integration so as to leave complements free to compete. Classically, this was the approach in the old Bell System following the
Carterfone mandate, which allowed non-AT&T equipment—
notably, telephones and switches—to access standard interfaces as plug-in devices.16 The result was that, even while phone
networks maintained monopoly services for voice and data
transport, competitive rivalry developed with respect to network-connected devices.17
Of course, the regulated monopoly featured in the old
AT&T (“Ma Bell”) system yielded economic incentives distinct
from those in other markets, posing challenges for regulators
specific to the industry.18 The Telecommunications Act of 1996
statutorily ended, for all practical purposes, regulation of cable
TV rates.19 The subscription video market has also become increasingly competitive as satellite and phone providers have
emerged as direct rivals of cable companies, thereby limiting
profit margins.20 Moreover, whatever the gains from the expansion of equipment markets in the wake of Carterfone, competitive entry in telephones did not generally create competition for
underlying network services.21 That development had to wait
for inter-modal competition offered by cable TV operators (for
fixed services) and cellular networks (for fixed-to-mobile substitution).22 That is a key fact, given that the incentive for an un16. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C. 2d
420, 420–421 (1968); Teferent Leasing Corp., 45 F.C.C. 2d 204, 205 (1974),
aff’d sub nom. N.C. Util. Comm’n v. F.C.C., 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1976); Mebane Home Tele. Co., 53 F.C.C. 2d 473, 473–475 (1975), aff'd sub nom. Mebane Home Tele. Co. v. FCC, 535 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
17. Faulhaber, supra note 1, at 73, 79, 96.
18. See Marius Schwartz, The Economic Logic for Conditioning Bell Entry
into Long Distance on the Prior Opening of Local Markets, 18 J. REG. ECON.
247, 261–266 (Nov. 2000) (explaining the incentives of entering the local and
long distance phone markets).
19. John Allen Hendricks, The Telecommunications Act of 1996: Its Impact on the Electronic Media of the 21st Century, 21 COMM. & L. 39, 48 (1999).
See also General Cable Television Industry and Regulation Fact Sheet, FED.
COMM. COMMISSION (June 2000), http://www.fcc.gov/mb/facts/csgen.html.
20. Thomas Hazlett & Dennis Weisman, Market Power in U.S. Broadband
Services 20–21 (George Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 09-69, 2009),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1525568##.
21. See id.
22. Dan Brenner, Creating Effective Broadband Network Regulation, 62
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regulated service provider to anti-competitively foreclose a vertical service rival focuses on protection of the underlying market.23
Despite these facts, as well as the distinctions of AT&T’s
regulated monopoly, suggestions have been made recently to
impose vertical limits, à la Carterfone, in a variety of markets.
These include a “Wireless Carterfone” by Tim Wu24 and a proposal for extensive network sharing obligations on U.S. broadband providers in an FCC-commissioned study produced in
2009 by Harvard Law School’s Berkman Center.25 Given these
policy arguments and others similar in nature, it is important
to evaluate the evidence gleaned from instances in which regulators have already sought to impose such rules. STBs are one
prime area not yet addressed in the academic literature.
This paper proceeds in the following way: In Section II, we
discuss the general issue of vertical integration, considering the
efficiency and foreclosure theories describing marketplace outcomes. In Section III we trace the path of FCC STB rules from
1996 through 2009. Section IV then evaluates this regulatory
strategy. Section V presents evidence regarding the market results of the FCC STB rules and includes a historical account of
the parallel evolution of satellite TV STBs, where an unbundled product market evolved into a vertically integrated structure due to market forces. A summary and conclusion is offered
in Section VI.
II. EFFECTS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION
Section 629 (then section 304) of the Telecommunications
Act was enacted to create a “proconsumer”26 environment that
FED. COMM. L. J. 13, 42–43 (2010).
23. See James C. Cooper, Luke M. Froeb, Dan O’Brien & Michael G. Vita,
Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference, 23 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG.
639, 641 (2005) (suggesting that a vertically integrated market power capable
of raising prices to un-integrated rivals would necessarily avoid doublemarkup distortions and thus increase consumer welfare).
24. Tim Wu, Wireless Carterfone, 1 INT'L J. COMM. 389, 391 (2007),
http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/view/152/96.
25. Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y, Next Generation Connectivity: A
Review of Broadband Internet Transitions, and Policy from Around the World
83
(Oct.
2009)
(unpublished
report),
available
at
http://www.fcc.gov/stage/pdf/Berkman_Center_Broadband_Study_13Oct09.pdf.
26. 142 CONG. REC. 1170 (1996) (statement of Rep. Edward Markey); Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Petition
for Rulemaking of Public Knowledge, et al, 13 (2009) [hereinafter Petition for
Rulemaking],
available
at
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will be “designed to make cable equipment cheaper and easier
to use for all consumers.”27 In the legislators’ views, consumers
were “tired of paying rent for cable converter boxes and struggling with multiple clickers for the TV set-top box and their
video machines.”28 We are now able, given enactment of this
“proconsumer” policy, to evaluate its effectiveness.
A. FIRM BOUNDARIES
Bundling services, such as when cable STBs are rented as
part of the cable TV service, is a form of vertical integration.29
At a general level, vertical integration is ubiquitous and efficiency-enhancing.30 Firms do not attempt to minimize the
number of inputs that they own; rather, they optimize to reduce
costs, mixing complementary assets within the firm.31 Even the
smallest restaurant or grocery store owns a considerable proportion of the resources it employs in providing retail services.
Furthermore, as Steven Cheung has pointed out, the lines between what is internal and what is external to the firm become
blurred by the use of contracts: when the restaurant pays the
cook an hourly wage or a weekly salary, are the hours worked
internal to the firm?32 While the firm does not own the cook, it
does claim rights to the labor produced by the cook. To that extent, the restaurant vertically integrates into cooking even as it
contracts for labor inputs supplied by non-owners.
It is important to start at this basic level. Where vertical
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020354735.
27. 142 CONG. REC. 2016 (1996) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). See
also Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 26.
28. 142 CONG. REC. 2016 (1996) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
29. Robert E. McCormick, William F. Shughart II & Robert D. Tollison, A
Theory of Commodity Bundling in Final Product Markets: Professor Hirshleifer Meets Professor Becker, 26 INT’L REV L & ECON. 162, 164 (2006).
30. Id. at 163 (“Commodity bundling is pervasive. From a McDonald’s
Happy Meal® to personal computers preloaded with an operating system, a
web browser and a media player, consumers are confronted daily with take-itor-leave-it offers requiring them to purchase bundles of products preassembled
for them or nothing at all.”).
31. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 391–
392, 395 (1937) (suggesting that firms will naturally organize themselves to
rely on transactions with other firms as little as possible to avoid contract
costs, and expand vertically until it is no longer practical to do so). See also
Steven Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 1, 18
(1983) (expanding on Coase’s theory of the vertical expansion of firms).
32. Cheung, supra note 31, at 10–12, 17.
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integration is seen, ipso facto, as evidence of anti-competitive
conduct, general perspective has been lost.33 In his initial formulation, Coase followed the intuition that companies produce
internally when it is efficient to do so.34 When inputs can be
less expensively provided by outside suppliers, the firm will naturally seek to use the “price system” to purchase these products rather than supplying them internally.35 Efficiencies of
vertical integration are seized in the quest for competitive superiority.
Efficiencies can even be realized in situations where internal costs of production equal external supply costs by reducing
transactions costs, including those emanating from double
marginalization (effectively eliminating the exercise of market
power by a supplier) or the cost of contracting.36 The imperfection of contracts in aligning economic incentives may permit
producers of complementary inputs to opportunistically hold-up
their fellow suppliers in the production chain, appropriating
rents.37 Vertical integration is seen to remedy this problem, encouraging productive investments.38 Alternatively, a firm may
integrate to foreclose rivals, increasing profits via anticompetitive behavior. The strategy relies on creating barriers to entry
(in either the upstream or downstream market) by increasing
the scale and scope of new competitors.39 In certain circumstances, this restricts output and raises quality-adjusted prices
paid by consumers.40 While early ACF theories were not wellformulated,41 more recent analysis has offered profitmaximizing rationales.42 Empirical research has not, however,
33. Cooper et al., supra note 23, at 241 (demonstrating the fragility of using vertical integration to show anticompetitive equilibria).
34. Coase, supra note 31, at 395.
35. Id.
36. Cheung, supra note 31, at 4.
37. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM 199–200 (1985) (giving petroleum suppliers and buyers as an example of suppliers charging entry fees and penalties to buyers in exchange for
initial and continuing supply).
38. See id. at 88–89 (showing that as inter-firm relations approach vertical integration, hazards that lead to nonproduction are eliminated).
39. Cooper et al., supra note 23, at 642–43.
40. See id. at 648 (citing a study in which vertical integration in the cable
industry raised consumer prices).
41. ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 16 (1978).
42. See Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration
and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation
in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 103 (2003).
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produced much evidence of anti-competitive vertical integration.43
B. EFFICIENCY V. FORECLOSURE
Despite this lack of evidence, vertical integration was historically viewed as suspicious by antitrust scholars who saw
such forms of organization as motivated by the desire to create
barriers to entry.44 The idea was that, if a manufacturer bought
a retail distributor, the services of the retailer were “foreclosed”
—competing manufacturers would no longer be able to sell
their products through stores now owned by its product rival.45
Until the 1970s, the Supreme Court shared this perspective. In
1956 the Court struck down a vertical merger that was allegedly foreclosing a negligible percentage of the market.46 In the
1961 case Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, the Court invalidated a vertical merger that allegedly foreclosed 5% and 1% of
the respective market.47 A decade later, Ford Motor Co. v. United States struck down a vertical merger involving 10% of the
market.48
Starting in the 1970s a new understanding began to
emerge.49 Economists critically evaluated the theory on which
vertical integration foreclosed competition, finding it arithmetically deficient.50 Whatever existing retail capacity was captured
by a manufacturer via merger would be offset by the retail capacity “opened” to rivals as the manufacturer shifted its sales
to the integrated sales channel.51 Moreover, the leveraging of
43. See Cooper, et al., supra note 23, at 641 (suggesting that a vertically
integrated market power capable of raising prices to unintegrated rivals would
necessarily avoid double-markup distortions and thus increase consumer welfare).
44. See JOE BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 155–56 (1956) (arguing
that there are few industries in which vertical integration would be necessary
for legitimate cost-cutting purposes).
45. Id. at 16.
46. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593,
607–08 (1956).
47. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 343–44 (1961).
48. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 578 (1971); id. at 589
(Berger, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
49. See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127
U. PA. L. REV. 925, 931–32 (1979) (suggesting that in the 1970s traditional industrial organization began to lose credibility).
50. Id. at 932.
51. Id. at 936.
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market power, expanding monopoly upstream or downstream,
was shown to be uncompelling.52 In the standard case, there is
only one monopoly profit per end product, and profits are maximized if complementary products are sold at competitive prices.53 Efforts by a monopolist to vertically expand do not, in this
case, increase monopoly power but lead to efficiencies—as the
integration is undertaken to bring prices of complements (or
inputs) to competitive levels.54 As noted, some foreclosure possibilities remain, even if these are tied to pre-emption of horizontal rivalry—vertical integration serving as a means of raising rivals’ costs.55
Economic studies strongly tend to support the proposition
that vertical integration aids efficiency rather than foreclosure.
As a comprehensive 2005 survey finds:
• Most studies find vertical integration precompetitive;
• Efficiency is often attributed to eliminating doublemarkups or cost savings;
• Studies find evidence consistent with “dealer services”
efficiencies;
• It is difficult to find cases where vertical controls are
unambiguously anticompetitive.56
C. VERTICAL RELATIONS IN THE MARKET FOR SET-TOP BOXES
AND EFFICIENCIES DERIVED FROM INTERNALIZATION OF
TRANSACTION COSTS
Some argue that cable companies leverage market power
in video services to extract monopoly charges for STBs via
monthly rental fees.57 This leaves unexplained why cable operators do not simply extract such sums in cable service fees,
which, given the operators’ market power, can be set to include
whatever surcharge would otherwise be imposed on STBs. In
52. See id. at 935 (suggesting that the cost of expanding and maintaining
monopolies vertically is greater than the costs of transacting with upstream
and downstream monopolies).
53. See id. at 934 (introducing the Chicago analysis’ belief that price discrimination by a monopoly will move output to competitive levels).
54. Id.
55. See Bain, supra note 44.
56. Cooper, et al., supra note 23, at 658.
57. Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 26, at 12–14 (arguing that consumers must rent set-top boxes for more than it would cost to buy them because of the monopoly cable companies hold in the set-top box market). See
also CONNECTING AMERICA, supra note 7, at 50–51 (explaining the monopoly
service providers have in set-top boxes).
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short, if every subscriber needs a cable STB, then the cable
monopolist does not obtain new market power by charging customers for the bundle (service + set-top box), as opposed to service alone. Indeed, the most likely explanation of STB fees is
that they allow the cable operator to lower prices to priceelastic (perhaps low-income) customers who may restrict their
TV viewing to one TV set (and STB), while charging less pricesensitive (presumably higher-income) households higher prices
via multiple STB rentals.58 This may be seen as a price discrimination scheme, but its effect is typically to increase output and
reduce the inefficiency of whatever market power is enjoyed in
the cable market.59 Moreover, such pricing invigorates competitive entry; to the extent that new rivals can anticipate such
marketing models, market forces supporting competitive entry
are intensified.60
Questions are raised about why cable companies lease, rather than sell, STBs to customers.61 Some view the practice as a
way for the cable companies to obtain disproportionate returns
from cable customers.62 Yet, almost all other multichannel video programming distributions (MVPD), including directbroadcast satellite (DBS) and Internet protocol television
(IPTV) providers, rely on a similar business model.63 The capital costs are absorbed by the network provider; subscribers pay
monthly charges to amortize both these costs and general network overhead.64 Competitive mobile phone providers also
58. McCormick et al., supra note 29, at 177.
59. Id.
60. Posner, supra note 49, at 934.
61. 142 CONG. REC. 2016 (1996) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). See
also Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 26 (asking “that the Commission initiate a rulemaking to address the lack of competition in the video device market”).
62. E.g., 142 CONG. REC. 2016 (1996) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy)
(complaining that consumers have no choice but to pay for high-end equipment while actually receiving antiquated equipment).
63. E.g.,
English
Packages,
DIRECTV,
http://www.directv.com/DTVAPP/new_customer/base_packages.jsp? (last visited Sept. 30, 2010).
64. See e.g., AT&T U-verse Packages, AT&T, http://www.att.com/uverse/shop/index.jsp?rel=nofollow&wtSlotClick=1-00477W!901481-11#fbid=a4UCh2JyDGc (last visited Nov. 21, 2010); Direct TV Prices, DIRECTV,
http://www.directstartv.com/directv/directv_pricing.html (last visited Nov. 21,
2010);
Packages
and
Plans,
VERIZON,
http://www22.verizon.com/Residential/FiOSTV/Plans/Plans.htm (last visited
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structure network and handset capital costs largely the same
way, with subscribers paying equipment costs in the form of
monthly access fees and per-minute charges over the life of
their contract.65
III. FCC SET-TOP BOX REGULATIONS AND THE MVPD
MARKET
A. CABLE SET-TOP BOXES AND THE ADVENT OF REGULATION
A set-top box is a device that connects a stream of video
signals, in this case delivered via a cable or satellite television
provider, to a subscriber’s television set.66 The box then controls channel selection, usually via a short-range wireless
command sent by the viewer via a remote control device.67 Most
STBs used today also feature a “return path,” meaning that, in
addition to video content flowing from the cable TV head-end to
the subscriber’s household, the household can send signals to
the head-end.68 In the language of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, cable STBs are “navigation devices.”69

Nov. 21, 2010); Satellite TV Program & Digital TV Packages, DISH NETWORK,
http://www.dishnetwork.com/packages/programming/default.aspx (last visited
Nov. 21, 2010).
65. E.g.,
Family
Share
Plans,
VERIZON
WIRELESS,
http://www.verizonwireless.com:80/b2c/splash/planfamily.jsp (last visited Sept.
30, 2010).
66. Set-Top Box, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Set-top_box (last
modified Sept. 16, 2010).
67. Id.
68. Detailed Explanation of Set Top Boxes, THE INTERACTIVE TELEVISION
DICTIONARY AND BUSINESS INDEX, http://www.itvdictionary.com/settop_box.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2010).
69. FCC’s use of the term “navigation devices” means converter boxes, interactive equipment, and other equipment used by consumers within their
premises to receive multichannel video programming and other services offered over multichannel video programming systems. Implementation, supra
note 10, at 14776 n.1.
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Exhibit 1. Use of a Cable Set-Top Box

TV Set

Cable Signal

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 directed the FCC to

[A]dopt regulations to assure the commercial availability . . . of converter boxes, interactive communications equipment, and other
equipment used by consumers to access multichannel video programming and other services offered over multichannel video programming systems, from manufacturers, retailers, and other vendors
not affiliated with any multichannel video programming distributor.70

A primary obstacle to customer purchases of boxes supplied by third parties was in the security and authentication
features of the box.71 Cable TV systems are designed as “bus
systems,”72 meaning that all the video services supplied by the
cable operator are loaded at the system head-end and carried
everywhere with different services “disembarking” at those
70. 47 U.S.C. § 549 (2006).
71. Implementation, supra note 10, at 14776 para. 4.
72. Satellite systems are similarly designed, with the obvious difference
that the “bus” is wireless.
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points where paying customers are connected.73 That is, all
electronic content flows from the cable head-end on wires passing every customer’s (and potential customer’s) home; it then
flows to individual household “drops” based on information as
to which homes subscribe and what services they are entitled to
receive.74 This information is embedded in STBs. If subscribers
are to buy these devices from companies other than the cable
operator, there has to be some standard mechanism for inserting subscriber data into the equipment.75
In 1998, the FCC instituted an “integration ban” requiring
MVPDs to separate their conditional access and security data
from other functions in the STB, also known as a “host device.”76 The initial deadline was July 1, 2000.77 This was intended to allow manufacturers and retailers to sell host devices
to consumers while allowing MVPDs to maintain control over
their content.78 This policy was a form of structural separation,
although cable operators would still be allowed to market STBs
to customers as part of their video service.79
Subsequently, the FCC established January 1, 2005 as the
new deadline for compliance with the integration ban.80 The
FCC extended this deadline to July 1, 2007 at the request of
cable operators, allowing them additional time to determine the
feasibility of developing a downloadable security function that
would permit compliance with the Commission’s rules.81 Were
such a software product to become available, it would presumably lower the costs of the integration ban relative to the alternative—using separate hardware devices (one for user authorization, one for channel selection).82
73. The Definition of Headend, THE INTERACTIVE TELEVISION DICTIONARY
BUSINESS INDEX, http://www.itvdictionary.com/definitions/headend_headend_head_end_definition.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2010).
74. Id.
75. CableCARD,
WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CableCARD#Technical_overview
(last
visited
Sept. 30, 2010).
76. 63 F.R. 38089-01, 38090 (1998).
77. Id.
78. “No Commission action in this proceeding should be construed to authorize or justify any use, manufacture, or importation of equipment that
would violate Section 633 of the Communications Act or any other provision of
law precluding the unauthorized reception of MVPD service.” Id.
79. Id.
80. Implementation, supra note 10, at 14803 para. 69.
81. 47 C.F.R. § 76.1204(a)(1) (2010).
82. Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
AND
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In December 2002, the cable and consumer electronics industries adopted a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that
reflected a compromise agreement to integrate the navigation
functionality of STBs into television receivers as part of the digital television transition.83 In January 2003, the FCC issued
the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPR) seeking
comments on the MOU and the proposed “plug and play”84 cable compatibility standard. This standard would allow consumers to directly attach their “digital cable ready” television receivers to cable systems and receive one-way cable television
services without the need for an external navigation device.85
In April 2003, the FCC requested the cable and consumer electronics industries to provide status reports on their negotiations for bidirectional digital cable receivers and products at 90,
180, and 270 day intervals.86 After the submission of the last
status report to the Commission, the public was given 30 days
to submit comments.
In October 2003, the FCC issued the Second Report and
Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, implementing the technical rules proposed as part of the MOU
with some modifications.87 In the follow-up Report and Order
issued on March 17, 2005, the FCC investigated the state of the
navigation device market and concluded that the state of the
competition in the navigation devices market as of that date
was not sufficient to assure the commercial availability of such
devices.88 The FCC cited contentions from Motorola and ScienCommercial Availability of Navigation Devices, Second Report and Order, 20
FCC Rcd. 6794, 6810 para. 31 (2005) [hereinafter Implementation 2].
83. See Letter from Carl E. Vogel, President and CEO, Charter Commc’ns,
et al., to Michael K. Powell, Chairman, FCC (Dec. 19, 2002), available at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=6513399175.
84. The FCC’s proposed “plug and play” rules were aiming to allow consumers to receive cable programming without the need of a STB. Implementation 2, supra note 82, at 6797 para. 9. Hence, the cable would plug directly into
the TV set without need for a STB.
85. Id.
86. Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, Order and Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd. 7924, at 7926 para. 5 (2003).
87. Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996:
Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, Second Report and Order and
Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd. 20885, at 20891
para. 10 (2003).
88. Implementation 2, supra note 82, at 6794 para 2.
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tific Atlanta that they had attempted to negotiate deals with
retailers to purchase and market STBs but received little to no
retailer interest.89 The Consumer Electronics Retailers Coalition (CERC), a trade group representing retailers, argued that
even were STBs independently retailed, MVPDs would place
obstacles in the path of competitive entrants.90
The FCC continued to press the integration ban. The cable
industry challenged this policy in three separate petitions to
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, each of which was denied.91
In limited circumstances, cable operators are eligible for waivers, to be granted where the FCC finds it “necessary to assist
the development or introduction of a new or improved multichannel video programming or other service offered over multichannel video programming systems, technology, or products.”92
In March 2005, the FCC stated that it would consider requests for waiver of the prohibition on integrated devices for
limited capability integrated digital cable boxes only. Requests
for such waivers were to include full specifications of the device.93 The grant of these waivers has caused a significant debate in the past several years as some claim that it impedes the
purpose of Section 629.94
In March 2010, the FCC released a National Broadband
Plan (NBP), which discusses difficulties in implementing the
CableCARD standard.95 In April 2010, the FCC then issued a
notice of inquiry (NOI) seeking comments on specific steps the
FCC can take to “unleash competition in the retail market for
smart, STB devices that are compatible with all multichannel
video programming distributor services.”96 In addition, the FCC
89. Id. at 6799 para. 14.
90. Id.
91. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 526 F.3d 763 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Charter
Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 460 F.3d 31 (D.C. Cir. 2006); General Instrument Corp. v.
FCC, 213 F.3d 724 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
92. 47 C.F.R. § 76.1207 (2009).
93. See Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, Order on Reconsideration, 14 FCC Rcd. 7596, 7603 para. 15 (1999).
94. See Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 26, at 28.
95. See CONNECTING AMERICA, supra note 7, at 50–52.
96. See Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, Notice of Inquiry, CS
Docket
No.
97-80
(Apr.
21,
2010),
available
at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-60A1.pdf.
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issued a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking where it proposes new rules for the CableCARD regime in the interim “until the successor solution becomes effective.”97 It seems apparent that the FCC will be concerned with creating and enforcing
STB rules for years to come. Appendix 1 outlines the chronology of STB proceedings to date.
There have been over 30 FCC Notices and more than 6,000
filings in the STB rulemaking.98 Two sides in the proceeding
may be said to be largely represented by the Consumer Electronics Association (CEA),99 pushing regulators to create rules
enabling a retail market in STBs, and the National Cable and
Telecommunications Association (NCTA),100 opposing such regulatory efforts.
B. CABLECARD AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE MARKET
By July 1, 2007, cable providers were ordered to begin separating the security and access features of their STBs. The
first CableCARD device became available from third party
manufacturers in August 2004. The CableCARD is a plug-in
module (similar in appearance to a credit card) that allows consumers to access, view, and record digital cable TV channels
without the use of an STB. Customers obtain CableCARDs by
subscribing to a cable provider. They may then insert the card
into their TV (assuming the TV has a slot for the card), an STB,
a personal video recorder, or other electronic device. The card
“unlocks” the channels and services to which the cable customer has subscribed.
The CableCARD standard was developed by CableLabs, a
research consortium modeled on the old Bell Labs, but owned
by the leading cable TV companies. Host devices that use CableCARDS must be certified as compliant by CableLabs. Cable
companies, in turn, make their networks compatible with Cab97. Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CS Docket No. 97-80 (Apr. 21, 2010), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-61A1.pdf.
98. Electronic Comment Filing System, FED. COMM. COMMISSION,
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/proceeding/view?z=v0oml&name=97-80 (last visited
Oct. 11, 2010).
99. Members of Consumer Electronics Association (CEA) manufacture
consumer electronics.
100. Members of National Cable and Telecommunications Association
(NCTA) manufacture cable TV systems.
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leCARDs and host devices certified by CableLabs.101 Such
stand-alone devices, however, lack many functionalities of the
traditional cable STB, including video-on-demand, subscriber
guides, and other interactive features. As of June 2009, 29 vendors had 600 unidirectional digital cable-ready models (such as
Digital Cable Ready DTV sets) approved for use with CableCARD,102 as well as eight thru2way devices.103 Actually selling
and deploying such devices, so as to create a new third-party
market, is quite another matter, as discussed in the Empirical
Evidence section below.
IV. POLICY-INDUCED COMPETITION
A. FAULHABER’S FRAMEWORK
Gerald Faulhaber has examined a range of important cases
in which policy makers have sought to open telecommunications markets to competition.104 He focuses on policy interventions that require regulators to police the standards or terms
used for market access, much as has been done in the FCC’s
implementation of CableCARD. The traditional rationale, dating to Carterfone, is to competitively discipline a service market
monopolist in its primary market or in markets for complements. The problem is that, for rivalry that does not entirely
displace the incumbent in the underlying service market, entrants will be forced to deal (“interconnect” in telecommunications jargon) with the service provider they seek to compete
with. Examining the record, Faulhaber concludes that such
rules may be successful in nurturing competition if either one
of two conditions are met:
1. The market boundary is simple to define and easy to
monitor;

101. Chris Kohler, CableCard Swipes at Set-Top Boxes, WIRED (Aug. 30,
2006), http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006/08/71682.
102. CABLELABS
CERTIFICATION
AND
QUALIFICATION,
http://www.cablelabs.com/certqual/ (last visited May 27, 2010).
103. The tru2way® brand is the cable industry's common software platform
for two-way digital TV devices. It establishes a common software platform
that enables cable companies, content developers, network programmers, consumer electronics companies, and others to extend interactivity to the television set and many other devices. See Brand Guidelines, THRU2WAY (Feb. 27,
2008), http://www.tru2way.com/downloads/tru2way_PrelimGuidelines.pdf.
104. See Faulhaber, supra note 1, at 73-97.
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2. The monopolist is enjoined from operating in the newly
competitive market.105
Faulhaber applies this hypothesis to the FCC’s adoption of
policies designed to induce competition into the customer premises equipment (CPE) market of direct concern in Carterfone.
These policies allowed new entrants to enter monopolized segments of a sector where the basic service (local telephone service) would remain monopolized after the entry occurred. To
induce competition, FCC policies had to specify and police the
technical interface between different parts of the Bell System,
specifically designing a modular plug-in layer where non-Bell
phone equipment could interconnect to access the network.
The government is here trying to take certain functions
outside the firm, for competitive reasons, tempering the vertical integration of an established service provider. This effort can
be examined though the lens of the theory of the firm,106 which
suggests that the following transactions are most efficiently
done within the firm:
• Those that involve long-term assets;
• Those that have significant information requirements;
and
• Those requiring complex and ongoing coordination.107
The FCC’s CPE policy was to move an important boundary
between complements outside of the Bell monopoly; the regulated interface would make it difficult for the firm to not cooperate with independent rivals (CPE vendors) without depreciating the value of its own system (and its revenues). This
approach ultimately proved successful.108 The border between
the network and the CPE had already been largely defined by
Bell engineers and was not difficult to describe or police. The
cost of compliance with the standards was relatively low. Competition was, therefore, invigorated in the ancillary (equipment,
not service) market.109
The CPE example shares structural similarity with the
105. Id. at 77.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 78.
108. See generally Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules
and Regulations, 77 F.C.C. 2d 384, 447 (1980). See also Customer Premises
Equipment, CYBERTELECOM, http://www.cybertelecom.org/ci/cpe.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2010).
109. See Faulhaber, supra note 1, at 78.
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cable STB effort. Both concern efforts to introduce equipment
competition by imposing a regulated interface between devices
and a communications network. The economic facts differ widely, however. First, there is no monopoly today in cable analogous to that existing in the Bell System. While cable operators
demonstrated substantial market power in the 1980s and
1990s, competitive entry by satellite operators and telephone
carriers have forced cable systems to compete across three retail services—video, voice, and data. The upshot is that abovecompetitive profits, apparent two decades ago, have disappeared when the market valuations of cable (or telephone carrier rivals) are examined.110
Second, the cable network is not price-regulated. This is
key because when a network operates under rate of return regulation, it has an economic interest in pushing profits into an
ancillary (unregulated) market as AT&T did.111 Cable TV systems were price-regulated under the 1992 Cable Act, but these
controls were lifted by statute in the Telecommunications Act
of 1996.112 Hence, guarding against cross-subsidy incentives
disappears as a rationale for regulation.
Third, the CableCARD interface is not the simple, efficient
border found between the telephone network and a registered
jack, but a complicated, dynamically evolving commercial product. There are over 1,000 cable providers. These firms use
many different technologies or architectures to offer a wide array of different services (such as HD, DVR, 3-D and interactive
services and applications).113 Cable operators do not own STB
suppliers, companies such as Motorola, Cisco, Thomson, Samsung, Panasonic, Pace, and TiVo, but must cooperate with them
110. Hazlett & Weisman, supra note 20.
111. This served as the rationale for line of business restrictions, in fact,
keeping the post-divestiture Regional Bell Operating Companies out of equipment, long distance, and information services markets. See Timothy Brennan
& Karen Palmer, Comparing the Costs and Benefits of Diversification by Regulated Firms, 6 J. REG. ECON. 115, 115–36 (1994).
112. See THOMAS W. HAZLETT & MATTHEW L. SPITZER, PUBLIC POLICY
TOWARD CABLE TELEVISION: THE ECONOMICS OF RATE CONTROLS 140–41
(1997).
113. See Industry Data, NCTA, http://www.ncta.com/Statistics.aspx (last
visited Oct. 11, 2010). There are five major cable companies and many smaller
ones. See Residential Voice, Data, and Video Services Market Highlights,
INFONETICS RESEARCH, http://www.infonetics.com/pr/2009/Residential-VoiceData-Video-Services-Market-Highlights.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2010) (noting
that “the market is dominated by AT&T, Verizon, and Comcast in the US and
Bell Canada and Rogers in Canada”).
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in the production of complementary services even as these box
makers simultaneously cooperate with cable’s rivals (satellite
and telco TV operators).
In contrast, the Bell System was a uniform entity operating under AT&T’s standards, one of which had already defined
the plug interface between telephones and the network. AT&T
itself supplied CPE to end users via a wholly-owned subsidiary,
Western Electric,114 and created standards for both network
and CPE design via another subsidiary, Bell Labs. While regulators allowed the Bell System to continue selling CPE equipment in competition with independent vendors, the market
boundary was simple and easily policed. Faulhaber, following
the conventional wisdom, finds that the regulation was successful.115
Despite private sector investment that may run into the
billions of dollars to develop CableCARD and to make the associated cable TV network upgrades,116 the retail market for
STBs remains nascent. As in the telephone CPE structure, cable operators are not enjoined from operating in the market
and continue to purchase STBs from suppliers, reselling them
in service bundles. While it appears clear that imposing line-ofbusiness restrictions to eliminate this integration (boxes and
services) would prove highly disruptive (presumably the rationale for the FCC avoiding this path), it also leaves either of the
(separately) necessary pre-conditions for successful policyinduced competition unmet. So far, the empirical result is consistent with the theory.
B. THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE REGULATION OF NAVIGATION DEVICES
The FCC’s National Broadband Plan, some 376 pages in
length, was released in March 2010.117 Among the many policy
questions analyzed, the plan discusses the CableCARD proceeding in some detail. It documents that the effort to develop a
114. Western
Electric,
WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Electric (last modified Sept. 27, 2010).
115. See Faulhaber, supra note 1, at 79.
116. See Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, Comments of National
Cable and Telecommunications Association on NBP Public Notice #27, CS
Docket No. 97-80 (Dec. 22, 2009).
117. CONNECTING AMERICA, supra note 7, at 50–52.
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robust retail marketplace for STBs has proven a failure.118 It
notes that the top two cable STB manufacturers, Motorola and
Cisco, together captured a 95 percent share of unit shipments
over the first three quarters of 2009. That is up from 87 percent
in 2006. The NBP contrasted the cable STBs retail market to
the robust competition in wireless handsets, stating that while
only 11 STBs have been certified for retail sale, more than 850
unique handsets were certified to operate on U.S. mobile networks in 2009 alone.119
The fact that the FCC finds the mobile handsets market
highly competitive is itself an important data point. First, similarly to the cable STB market, the market for mobile phones
features active involvement by service providers. Most handsets (like STBs) are purchased in service bundles offered by
networks. Due to competition in services and technologies,
wireless networks offer distinct handset choices; in some instances, makes or models are exclusive to a particular network.
Customers therefore tend to select services and handsets as a
combination, even when the items are sold separately. But
they are typically sold in bundles. Most mobile providers offer a
free mobile telephone when a client signs a contract (usually 2year) with them.120 Similarly, most cable STB customers lease
their equipment from the cable provider.121
Ironically, while noting that CableCARD has failed to
achieve its policy goal, the NBP recommends that the FCC proceed to ensure that all MVPDs (not just cable operators) install
a CableCARD-type gateway device. This extends the failed policy, mandating “openness” in devices even for emerging competitors attempting to take market share from cable TV incumbents. The new goal would start to replace STBs in non-cable
MVPD homes starting before January 1, 2013.122

118. Id. at 50.
119. Id. at 18.
120. See,
e.g.,
Free
Phones
Cell
Phone
Sales,
AT&T,
http://www.wireless.att.com/cell-phone-service/cell-phone-sales/promotion/freephones.jsp (last visited Jan. 22, 2011); Online Exclusive! Free Phones,
VERIZON, http://www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/promo/splash/ewp?v=16 (last
visited Jan. 22, 2011); View Our Free Cell Phone Deals, T-MOBILE,
http://www.t-mobile.com/shop/phones/?priceRange=0-0 (last visited Jan. 22,
2011).
121. See CONNECTING AMERICA, supra note 7, at 18.
122. Id. at 51.
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V. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
A. FAILURE OF SET-TOP BOX RULES TO CREATE A NEW MARKET
Despite the FCC’s 14-year regulatory effort to make STBs
available through retail stores such as Best Buy or Wal-Mart,
the vast majority of cable navigation devices are yet supplied
by video service providers as part of standard service bundles.123 Counting only those CableCARD-enabled boxes purchased or leased since the “integration ban” kicked in on July 1,
2007, some 19,532,000 were supplied to household subscribers
by cable TV operators, as against 489,000 purchased from retail outlets.124 Furthermore, given that before the “integration
ban” all STBs were without the mandated interface, the actual
universe of cable operator-supplied boxes is much larger—
about 61.6 million households. In addition, as Figure 1 demonstrates, the percentage of CableCARD subscribers has remained below 1 percent of the total cable subscriber base.

123. See, e.g., Motorola, Inc. Annual Report, 9 (Feb. 26, 2010), available at
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ABEA2FO3VV/914904892x0x351222/A609D0EB-D868-4605-A227D190A0BE17B4/2009_Motorola_10K_Final_clean_no_banners_.pdf.
124. These data are for the top ten U.S. cable operators, by subscriber size.
They count sales through February or early March, 2010 (depending on operator) as reported to the National Cable & Telecommunications Association
(NCTA). See NCTA, Re: CS Docket No. 97-80 (Commercial Availability of Navigation
Devices),
(March
31,
2010),
available
at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020399857.
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FIGURE 1. CABLECARD SUBSCRIBERS125
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In other words, despite the earnest regulatory efforts, administrative expense, and considerable private sector engineering cost, the policy initiative leaves between 97.5 percent to
over 99 percent126 of STBs distributed just the way they were
prior to the rules. Hence, the FCC’s conclusion that the CableCARD standard has “failed to stimulate a competitive retail
market for set-top boxes.”127
This lack of market development can also be seen in Table
1, which shows the top five cable TV operators in the United
States, accounting for over 80 percent of industry sales. None of
the five companies sees more than 1.3 percent of its subscribers
using retail-purchased STBs. The firms also report that they
charge customers to use CableCARD-enabled devices, from
125. Id. Data from quarterly reports submitted to the FCC, although firms
report sales as of different days. See, e.g., Top 25 Multichannel Video Programming
Distributor
as
of
Jun.
2010,
NCTA,
http://www.ncta.com/Stats/TopMSOs.aspx (last visited Oct. 31, 2010) (listing
system
subscribers);
Basic
Video
Customers,
NCTA,
http://www.ncta.com/Stats/BasicCableSubscribers.aspx (last visited Oct. 31,
2010) (listing total subscribers from 1975 to 2009).
126. 489,000 equals 0.8% of 62.1 million, which is total cable subscribership as of year-end 2009. See Basic Video Customers, NCTA,
http://www.ncta.com/Stats/BasicCableSubscribers.aspx (last visited Oct. 31,
2010).
127. See CONNECTING AMERICA, supra note 7, at 50.
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$1.50 to $2.55 per month (per card). Moreover, cable technicians must generally install the so-called “plug-n-play” boxes,
which results in additional costs for operators and fees for subscribers.
Table 1. Set-Top Boxes Distributed by Cable Systems v.
Retailers128
Fee
per
month

Installation
Fee

Total
Subscribers

% CableCARD

Cablevision

CableCARD
subscriptions
20,656

$2.00

$34.95

3,063,000

0.0067

Charter
Comcast

30,938
296,967

$2.00
$1.50

$35.00
$25.00

0.0064
0.0126

Cox
Time
Warner

42,818
48,048

$1.99
$2.55

$24.00
$26.01

4,824,000
23,559,00
0
5,195,000
12,859,00
0

0.0082
0.0037

B. THE EVOLUTION OF THIRD-PARTY SET-TOP BOXES FOR
SATELLITE TV
Although Section 629 applies to all MVPDs, the FCC has
mandated an integration ban only for cable TV STBs.129 This
difference has been appropriate, the FCC argues, because DBS
STBs have been available at retail outlets while cable STBs
have not been.130 Yet, the unbundled model, which was once
the standard in the early days of satellite TV, has evolved: to128. Letter from National Cable & Telecommunication Association to Marlene H. Dortch, FCC (March 31, 2010) (on file with Minnesota Journal of Law,
Science & Technology).
129. See CONNECTING AMERICA, supra note 7, at 67 n.105 (stating that the
FCC directly exempted satellite operators, e.g. DirecTV and DISH Network,
since they operate throughout the United States and offer devices for retail
sale through unaffiliated vendors, and certain Internet Protocol TV (IPTV)
providers, primarily small telephone operatives. AT&T (an IPTV provider) has
neither requested nor received a waiver for its U-Verse service. Verizon FiOS
is considered a cable service for regulatory purposes and is not exempted from
Section 629).
130. DISH and DirecTV, however, do not use compatible STB. The same is
true of AT&T and Verizon, the two major telco TV suppliers. This suggests
that efforts to disintegrate boxes and network services may be difficult, fruitless, or both.
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day, the overwhelming majority of subscribers to DBS (and
IPTV) video services rent or purchase STBs from service operators.131
When the satellite industry initially began deploying DBS
services starting in the 1990s, satellite providers utilized existing local retailers to sell their services and equipment. Circuit
City, for example, was one of these retailers, receiving a percentage of each STB that was sold to consumers in addition to a
percentage of the subscription fees the DBS provider was
charging.132 DBS providers relied on such retailers because
they, in contrast to cable operators, had no presence in the local
market. Cable providers, therefore, did not rely on independent
retail stores to supply subscribers’ equipment or to market
their services; DBS did. The initial structure for satellite relied
on industry standards, tailored to the two national service providers’ systems, but featured independent customer purchases
of boxes. Many vendors competed, including RCA, Sony, Toshiba, Zenith, General Instruments (now owned by Motorola), and
Thomson (renamed Technicolor).
Yet, over time, bundled bargains offered by satellite providers began appearing and independent sales of DBS boxes
declined and then vanished. It is not plausible that market
power explains the migration in market structure, for the simple reason that neither DirecTV nor EchoStar possessed such
power. Moreover, the DBS-wide migration, observed simultaneously for both standards, is consistent with only an efficiency
explanation: DBS providers bundled boxes to increase market
share against cable operators. The fact that they have been
highly successful in this effort is further evidence of efficiency
and against the hypothesis that the market restructuring was
output-restricting, the sine qua non of monopolistic behavior
(See Figure 2).

131. It is sometimes the case that retailers serve as the sales agents, but
the purchase package is determined by the operator in that there is little or no
“mixing and matching” of components within the service package. Customers
simply subscribe to the service through the retailer, with the network determining the STB configuration.
132. Interview with Stephen Effros, President of Effros Communications
and formerly Head of the Cable Telecommunications Association (CATA),
which later merged with NCTA (May 3, 2010).
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Figure 2. Cable vs. DBS Subscribers (1993-2008)133
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That satellite TV providers tried the unbundled model and
then abandoned that in favor of the bundled approach suggests
that integration of the video service package can be, and has
been, efficient. In attempting to create an independent retail
STB market for cable devices, the FCC produces its own evidence of this fact: no independent market has sprung to life.
Were major new advantages available to customers from direct
133. 13th Annual Report to Congress - Delivery of Video Programming, 24
FCC Rcd 542, 684 (FCC 2009); Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of Video Programming, 13 FCC Rcd 1034
(1998) (Providing data for years 1993–1997); Annual Assessment of the Status
of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of Video Programming, 17 FCC Rcd
1244 (2002) (Providing data for years 1997–2001); Families and Living Arrangements,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam.html (last visited Nov. 21,
2010); Larry Hettick, MSO v. DBS v. Telco: 2008 Winners and Losers by the
Numbers,
CURRENT
ANALYSIS
(Mar.
20,
2009),
http://www.currentanalysis.com/d/2009/ctia/ctia-ar-7.asp; Industry Data, supra note 113; Projections of Households by Type: 1995 to 2010, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/population/projections/nation/hhfam/table1n.txt (last visited Nov. 21, 2010).
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purchases via third parties, such sales would presumably materialize. Not only is it ironic that, having failed in cable, which
is the dominant segment of the MVPD market, the FCC is now
pushing its video “gateway” rules further, proceeding to unbundle boxes from video services offered by entrants DBS and
telco TV. Even more remarkable is that the effort may deter
the competitiveness of the new rivals which, in the case of DBS,
are designed as one-way (download) services rather than interactive communications networks:
DIRECTV has stated that the FCC’s gateway proceeding is misguided
because mandating an AllVid gateway in the home favors cable’s twoway architecture and disadvantages satellite providers, who, unlike
cable providers, are adding Internet capabilities to their boxes.134

IV. CONCLUSION
Despite a lengthy regulatory attempt by the FCC to implement a workable regime for creating a retail market for cable STBs, such market has not developed. Moreover, the stated
concern driving this regulatory initiative, that bundling cable
STBs with MVPD services impairs competition in either video
or STBs, appears unwarranted. The attempt by competitive entrants, notably satellite TV providers, to operate with unbundled boxes was itself a dead-end; market evolution brought
STBs back into the service provider’s product bundle. Lacking
market power, these firms ostensibly integrated to pursue efficiencies, not foreclosure.
A recent report by a consumer-oriented web page summarizes the curious history of STB regulations:
In 1996, Congress directed the Federal Communications Commission
to make it easier for consumers to buy set-top boxes from third-party
providers, potentially eliminating monthly lease fees. In fact, the reverse has occurred—consumers are paying more tack-on, set-top fees
than ever. And an FCC ruling in 2007 is blamed for pushing leasing
prices higher. That year, pay TV providers were forced to separate
their channel changing and channel security functions in their set-top
boxes, a move that was supposed to provide an opening for alternative
boxes. Consumers who wanted to buy their own simply had to insert a
CableCARD—similar to PCMCIA cards that were once common to
laptops—provided by the pay TV firm. But the so-called “integration
ban,” cable industry officials said, simply raised the cost of making
boxes, an increase that was passed on to consumers.135

134. Tim Doyle, Set-Top Innovation Could Precede FCC Rules, SNL.COM
(May
21,
2010,
10:08
AM), http://www.snl.com/interactivex/article.aspx?CDID=A-11212940-13877.
135. See Bob Sullivan, Set-Top TV Boxes: What Do You Pay?, THE RED
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The recently released NBP outlines the shortcomings of the
current regime, but perversely proposes new, broader regulations governing converter boxes. The empirical evidence, however, suggests that such an effort will not advance competitiveness in the marketplace, but deter it.

TAPE
CHRONICLES
(Apr.
20,
2010,
8:00
AM),
http://redtape.msnbc.com/2010/04/settop-box-rental-prices-going-up.html (emphasis added).
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APPENDIX 1
CHRONOLOGY OF FCC SET-TOP BOX PROCEEDING 9780136
Date
2/20/1997

Type
NPRM

Description
In this proceeding the FCC sought comment
on the implementation of section 629 of the
Communications Act, entitled “Competitive
Availability of Navigation Devices.” Section
629, which was added to the Communications
Act as part of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 instructs the FCC to:
Adopt regulations to assure the commercial
availability, to consumers . . . of equipment
used . . . to access multichannel video programming and other services offered over
multichannel video programming systems,
from manufacturers, retailers, and other
vendors not affiliated with any multichannel
video programming distributor.137
In this NPRM, the FCC states that the rules
under this section shall cease to apply when
the Commission determines that the markets
involved are competitive and that elimination
of the regulations would be in the public interest. Further, the FCC proposed the basic
principle that equipment that is not part of a
multichannel video programming distributors’ (MVPD’s) network distribution plan may
be acquired by subscribers and attached to
the network limited only by the requirement
that any such equipment attached to a
MVPD’s network not cause it any harm.
The FCC also inquired about what is the best
definition of “commercial availability” of navigation equipment.

136. See Electronic Comment Filing System, supra note 6.
137. 47 U.S.C. § 549 (2006).
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Description

This Order adopts rules and policies implementing
section 629:
The FCC determined that open video system operators are not covered as a consequence of the specific
open video system provisions of the Communications
Act which exclude open video system operators from
certain regulations applicable to cable operators.
Subscribers have the right to attach any compatible
navigation device to a multichannel video programming system. The FCC concluded that the core requirement, to make possible the commercial availability of equipment to MVPD subscribers, is similar to
the Carterfone principle.
Service providers are prohibited from taking actions
which would prevent navigation devices that do not
perform conditional access functions from being made
available by retailers, manufacturers or other unaffiliated vendors.
Cable operators and other MVPDs can take the necessary steps to guarantee the security of their systems
and their programming. The Order reaffirms the provisions of the Communications Act that prohibit the
manufacture, sale and distribution of equipment designed to allow for the unauthorized reception of service.
MVPDs must separate out security functions
from non-security functions by July 1, 2000. An
exception is made for navigation devices that operate
throughout the continental United States and are
commercially available from unaffiliated sources,
which includes DBS.
MVPDs may offer devices that have security and
non-security functions integrated until January
1, 2005. As of that date, no MVPD shall provide new
navigation devices for sale, lease, or use that perform
both conditional access functions and other functions
in a single integrated device. In the year 2000, once
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Date

Type

Description

5/14/1999

Order on
Recon.

Petitions for reconsideration of the Navigation Devices Order were filed by the Consumer Electronics
Manufacturers Association (CEMA), the National Cable Television Association (NCTA), the Telecommunication Industry Association (TIA), Time Warner, and
the Wireless Cable Association International (WCA).
In this Order for Reconsideration the FCC reviewed
these petitions, reconsidered a decision made in that
order relating to the application of the rules to analog
equipment, but otherwise reaffirmed the Navigation
Devices Order.

9/18/2000

Further
Notice

This Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Declaratory Ruling addressed two separate but related
matters regarding the Commission’s navigation devices rules. The navigation devices rules were adopted to
implement Sec. 629 of the Communications Act. In
adopting these rules, the FCC indicated that it would
monitor the development of commercial availability of
navigation devices and on reconsideration stated that
it would commence a proceeding in the year 2000 to
review the effectiveness of the rules and consider any
necessary changes. In this proceeding, the FCC undertook that review. In addition, questions were
raised as to whether certain of the mechanisms being
developed by the cable television industry relating to
the copying of digital video programming comply with
the existing rules.

1/10/2003

Further
Notice

In this Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking the
FCC sought comment on the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which details an agreement on a cable compatibility standard for an integrated unidirectional digital cable television receiver, as well as other
unidirectional digital cable products. Such standard
would allow consumers to directly attach their DTV
receivers to cable systems and receive cable television
services without the need for an external navigation
device. On December 19, 2002 the members of the dis-

separate security modules are available, the FCC
would assess the state of the market to determine
whether that time frame is appropriate and it will review the mechanics of the phase out of boxes that
have combined security and non-security functions.
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Date

Type

Description

4/25/2003

Order

This Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking extends the deadline concerning the prohibition on
integrated devices until July 1, 2006.

12/23/2003

Order

To prevent an unintended consequence in creating
disparity between MVPDs, the FCC revised the definition of Unencrypted Broadcast Television in the
FCC’s encoding rules.

3/17/2005

Order

The FCC extended the phase-out of integrated STBs
effectively until July 1, 2007. The FCC also stated
that it was “not persuaded” that the current level of
competition in the navigation device market is sufficient to assure the commercial availability of navigation devices to consumers from sources other than
multichannel
video
programming
distributors
(MVPDs).

10/3/2005

Order

The FCC extended the deadline for the first joint report regarding progress on the negotiation of a bidirectional agreement between the NTCA and CEA to
October 14, 2005.

12/23/2005

Order

The FCC granted additional time to Hewlett Packard,
Intel and ATI Technologies to file comments in response to a report filed by the cable industry on the
feasibility of implementing software-based conditional
access in navigation devices.

2007-2009

Waiver
Requests

Various requests for waivers of the requirement for
integrated STB phasing out were filed by different
companies.

03/16/2010

n/a

National Broadband Plan released. The purpose of the
plan was to reveal FCC’s plans for the future. With
respect to cable STBs, the plan discusses in some detail the difficulty of the CableCARD standard to develop a robust retail marketplace for STBs.138

cussion group, headed by the Consumer Electronics
Association (CEA) and the National Cable and Telecommunications Association (NCTA) reached the
MOU.

138. See CONNECTING AMERICA, supra note 7, at 50–52.
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04/21/2010

NOI

The NOI seeks comment on specific steps the FCC can
take to “unleash competition in the retail market for
smart, set-top video devices (“smart video devices”)
that are compatible with all multichannel video programming distributor (MVPD) services.” The Commission wants to explore the potential for allowing
any electronics manufacturer to offer smart video devices at retail that can be used with the services of
any MVPD and without the need to coordinate or negotiate with MVPDs.

04/21/2010

Further
Notice

With this FNPRM the FCC proposes new rules for the
CableCARD regime in the interim “until the successor
solution becomes effective.” In the Second Report and
Order related to navigation devices, rules were
adopted requiring a specific interface on leased STBs
to allow recording on digital recording devices. Multiple parties have raised concerns about whether the
rule is specific enough to be effective and whether
other interfaces could equally achieve this purpose.
The FCC seeks comment on proposed rules to more
fully specify the functionality of this interface and to
enable other interfaces as well.

10/14/2010

Report
and Order
on Recon.

FCC adopted new rules that (1) require cable operators to support the reception of switched digital video
services on retail devices; (2) prohibit price discrimination against retail devices; (3) require cable operators to allow self-installation of CableCARDs where
device manufacturers offer device-specific installation
instructions; (4) require cable operators to provide
multi-stream CableCARDs by default; and (5) clarify
that CableCARD device certification rules are limited
to certain technical features.

